A Cross-Section From Ottoman-Russian Negotiations After Küçük Kaynarca: A Dialogue Document Dated 1776

Özet

1768-1774 Ottoman-Russian War was a turning point for the Ottoman Empire in terms of its results. Because the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, signed on July 21, 1774, contained heavy conditions. In this context, although the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca ended the war between the two states, it also formed the basis for the emergence of new problems with the uncertainties it contained. Inasmuch as, citing the treaty, Russia made various attempts such as opening a consulate outside Istanbul, conducting commercial activities against the Ottomans in the Black Sea, and annexing the Crimea. This led to an intense negotiation process between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.

The dialogue document that we have published here, and which is registered with the number 91/44 within the classification of Yıldız Main Documents in the Ottoman Archives was also a product of this process. This document was important in terms of relations between the Ottoman Empire and Russia after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. The relevant document was shaped on the basis of the twelve-item questions raised by the reisülküttap Raif Ismail Efendi during his meeting with the Russian envoy Aleksandr Stachievich Stachiev at his residence in Kuzguncuk on May 7, 1776. These questions were about the situation of the people, the churches, the compensation payments, the situation of the Tatars. However, because Stachiev had to consult his state, he could not answer Raif Ismail Efendi immediately. Therefore, the expected response from Russia came only on September 15, 1776.

Tam Metin

<p><strong>Introduction</strong></p>
<p>The aim of this study is to publish the document of mükâleme (record of conversation) dated 15 September 1776, which constitutes a part of the negotiation processes that continued between the two states after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (21 July 1774), which put an end to the Ottoman–Russian War of 1768–1774. The reason for this is that the document in question contains important data regarding the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in the relevant period.</p>
<p>In this respect, the study consists of three parts. In the first part, brief mention will be made of the Ottoman–Russian War of 1768–1774 and the developments that took place afterwards, as this is essential for understanding the document in question. In the second part, the content of the mükâleme document will be examined. In the last part, the transcription of the mükâleme document will be presented.</p>
<p><strong>1. The Ottoman–Russian War of 1768–1774 and the Developments that Took Place Afterwards</strong></p>
<p>The Ottoman–Russian War of 1768–1774[<a href="https://belgeler.gov.tr/tam-metin/111/tur#fn1">1</a>] began after a relatively long period of peace that had emerged in the last years of the reign of Mahmud I (1730–1754) and continued, despite changes on the throne, up to the late 1760s. In this, Russia’s interference in the internal affairs of Poland and its bringing the country under its own influence, as well as Russian attacks on the territories of the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire, were determining factors. Consequently, Mustafa III (1757–1774) declared war on Russia on 8 October 1768 in an unprepared manner.</p>
<p>Accordingly, the war began with the attacks carried out by the Crimean khan, Kırım Giray Khan, against Russian territories at Kavușan on 31 January 1769, with a force of approximately 100,000 men. Kırım Giray Khan returned from this attack with more than 20,000 captives and a great amount of booty. However, his success was short-lived, as the Russians had him poisoned and killed in March 1769.</p>
<p>Following this initiative of the Crimean khan, the Ottoman army left Istanbul on 22 March 1769 under the command of Yağlıkçızâde Mehmed Emin Pasha. The army reached Isakça in May 1769 and Yassıtepe, near Bender, on 26 June 1769. Meanwhile, the Russians had laid siege to Hotin on 19 April 1769, but failed to achieve any result. Russian General Golitsyn launched a new attack on Hotin in July 1769. The Ottoman forces, with the support of 30–40 thousand cavalry arriving from outside the fortress, repulsed this assault, and the Russians were once again forced to withdraw on 17 July 1769.</p>
<p>Because of the grain shortage and desertions among the soldiers at this time, the Ottoman army was moved from Yassıtepe to Hantepesi. The person responsible for this was the grand vizier, Yağlıkçızâde Mehmed Emin Pasha. From the very start of the campaign, Mehmed Emin Pasha, who acted reluctantly, was of the opinion that the army would return without engaging in a war with the Russians and therefore did not consider it necessary to arrange any provisioning. For this reason, Moldovancı Ali Pasha was appointed to the grand vizierate in his place on 12 August 1769. Although Moldovancı Ali Pasha reinforced the Ottoman troops, he could not prevent the Russians from entering Hotin on 17 September 1769.</p>
<p>After Hotin, the Russians turned towards Wallachia and Moldavia, occupying Moldavia in November 1769 and Wallachia on 27 February 1770. On 1 August 1770, they defeated the Ottoman army at Kartal. Thus, the defeat at Kartal was one of the turning points of the war. Following this, the Russians occupied Ismail, Kili, Bender, Akkerman and İbrail. During this time, while the Greeks revolted in the Morea, the Russian fleet, which had come from the Baltic to the Mediterranean with the help of the British, burned the Ottoman fleet at Çeşme on 6–7 July 1770. Although peace initiatives were made after this, they were not sufficient to bring the war to an end.</p>
<p>Although Yergöğü Fortress fell into Russian hands on 24 February 1771, Muhsinzade Mehmed Pasha, who had suppressed the revolt in the Morea, succeeded in recapturing Yergöğü on 29 May 1771. On 8 July 1771, the Russians occupied the Crimea entirely. Afterwards, the Russians advanced along the Danube line, first seizing Yergöğü and then, on 29 October 1771, taking Tolçı. They then attacked the Ottoman encampment at Babadağı in November 1771 and once again routed the Ottoman army.</p>
<p>After this defeat, peace negotiations between the Ottoman Empire and Russia resumed at Yergöğü, and on 12 July 1772 it was decided to conclude an armistice on the condition that both parties remained where they were. Negotiations then moved to Focșani. However, after a process of about one month, no result was reached.</p>
<p>Talks that resumed in Bucharest on 2 November 1772 continued until 22 March 1773, but again no result was obtained, as the two sides could not agree on the independence of Crimea. Therefore, the Russians resumed action along the Danube, in Crimea, Georgia, Kuban and the Mediterranean. However, in addition to the Pugachev Rebellion in Russia, the death of Mustafa III on 21 January 1774 and the accession of Abdülhamid I (1774–1789) changed the nature of the situation. This was followed by defeat at Kozluca on 25 June 1774, after which the Russians occupied the Ottoman encampment at Shumen. Consequently, Grand Vizier Muhsinzade Mehmed Pasha accepted the Russian peace proposal on 3 July 1774.</p>
<p>The Ottoman plenipotentiaries arrived in Kaynarca on 16 July 1774. Peace talks then began between Ahmed Resmî Efendi and Rumyantsev. On 21 July 1774, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, consisting of 28 articles, was signed. According to this treaty, which contained severe conditions, Crimea was made into an independent khanate and the Tatars were granted the right to elect their own khan. However, in religious terms, Crimea would continue its allegiance to the caliphate and the Friday sermon (khutba) would be read in the name of the sultan. Moreover, neither state would interfere in the internal affairs of Crimea. The Ottoman Empire ceded a number of fortresses such as Kılburun, Kerç and Yenikale to Russia. In return, Russia was to withdraw its forces from the Caucasus and not intervene in this region. Russia would also return the fortresses of Wallachia, Moldavia, Akkerman, Kili, Ismail and Bender, which it had captured during the war. The status of Wallachia and Moldavia was determined and a general amnesty was granted to their inhabitants. The legal status of the Christians there was placed under the responsibility of Russia. In addition, Russia would return the places it had seized in the Mediterranean. Russian merchant ships would be able to navigate freely in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and benefit from the privileges granted to other states. Russia would be allowed to open consulates where necessary. Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire would pay an indemnity of 15,000 purses (7.5 million kuruş–4.5 million rubles) in three instalments. The Ottoman Empire would protect the rights and churches of Christians. Russia would build a church in Beyoğlu.</p>
<p>Within the framework of these severe conditions, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which was thus ratified, ended the war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. However, with the ambiguities it contained, it also laid the groundwork for new problems to emerge. For this reason, relations between the two states never truly calmed down after Küçük Kaynarca. The Aynalıkavak Convention, signed on 21 March 1779, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea on 8 April 1783 are concrete indications of this. The mükâleme document below also constitutes a part of this process.</p>
<p><strong>2. The Content of the Mükâleme Document</strong></p>
<p>The mükâleme document, registered in the Ottoman Archives under the classification Yıldız Esas Evrakı with the number 91/44[<a href="https://belgeler.gov.tr/tam-metin/111/tur#fn2">2</a>] , consists of thirteen folios. The document in question took shape within the framework of the meeting held by Raif İsmail Efendi (10 August 1774–22 July 1776)[<a href="https://belgeler.gov.tr/tam-metin/111/tur#fn3">3</a>] with the Russian envoy extraordinary, Aleksandr Stachieviç Stachiev, at his waterside mansion in Kuzguncuk on 7 May 1776, before Raif İsmail Efendi was dismissed from the office of reisülküttap (chief scribe/foreign minister). In this meeting, Raif İsmail Efendi addressed to Stachiev a number of questions consisting of twelve articles. However, Stachiev did not immediately respond to Raif İsmail Efendi’s questions, as he needed to discuss the matter with his own government.</p>
<p>The awaited reply from Russia arrived after Raif İsmail Efendi was dismissed from the office of reisülküttap. At that time, the reisülküttap was Atıfzade Ömer Vahid Efendi (22 July 1776–9 April 1778)[<a href="https://belgeler.gov.tr/tam-metin/111/tur#fn4">4</a>] . Accordingly, Stachiev held a second meeting with Atıfzade Ömer Vahid Efendi at the latter’s residence on 15 September 1776. They were accompanied by Stachiev’s interpreter, as well as the divan-ı hümayun (imperial council) interpreter of the period, the beylikçi Seyyid Mehmed Hayrullah Efendi, and the âmedî (chief clerk) Halil Hamid Efendi.</p>
<p>Stachiev wrote down Raif İsmail Efendi’s questions and the answers he would give to these questions in Russian on twenty-four sheets of paper. He read these sheets, article by article, in the presence of Atıfzade Ömer Vahid Efendi, who then gave the necessary responses. At the end of this meeting, which lasted approximately nine hours, the divan-ı hümayun interpreter and the envoy’s interpreter together translated the relevant sheets. In this way, the mükâleme document that we publish here was formed by first recording Raif İsmail Efendi’s question, then Stachiev’s answer to Raif İsmail Efendi’s question, and beneath that, the explanations made in the council.</p>
<p>The first article of the document concerns the indemnity of 15,000 purses (7.5 million kuruş–4.5 million rubles) which the Ottoman Empire was obliged to pay to Russia in three instalments. Raif İsmail Efendi emphasized that the Ottoman Empire had paid the first instalment of the indemnity in 1775 and that it was making every effort to pay the second instalment. Stachiev responded as follows: Russia is aware of the Ottoman Empire’s friendly attitude, and this is important for the welfare of the peoples of both sides. Moreover, Russia does not intend either to occupy the Ottoman Empire or to pave the way for foreign states to embark on such an enterprise. In the end, the Ottoman Empire has been gravely affected by this, and the war that has been fought is clear proof of it. Yet the Ottoman Empire is not sufficiently aware of this fact.</p>
<p>In response to this veiled threat by Stachiev, Atıfzade Ömer Vahid Efendi declared that, just as Russia attached importance to friendship, the Ottoman Empire likewise paid careful attention to it. He stated that there was no question of not paying the indemnity, and that the delay should not be regarded as something contrary to friendship.</p>
<p>In the second article, Raif İsmail Efendi expressed that certain articles, such as the indemnity clause, which caused confusion in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, needed to be rearranged and that Russia’s understanding was needed for the friendly resolution of these issues. If this were done, the friendship and closeness between the two states would be confirmed.</p>
<p>At this point, Stachiev stated that Russia could not understand in what respect the Ottoman Empire was complaining. In his view, Russia had complied, without exception, with every article in the new treaty. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire had no reason to complain in this respect. He also said that the Ottoman Empire regarded Russia’s attitude and actions as hostile. Yet, unlike the Ottomans, Russia had begun to evacuate all fortresses and territories under its responsibility, had set in motion the return of the fleet, and had endeavoured to send all Ottoman and Tatar prisoners to the borders at its own expense.</p>
<p>He then continued as follows: First, the Ottomans had delayed the surrender of Kılburun. Therefore, Russia had been compelled to hold the fortresses of Hotin and Bender for a while. Had Russia returned these fortresses earlier, the Ottoman Empire would probably have refused to surrender Kılburun under the pretext that the ulema would oppose it.</p>
<p>Second, Ottoman troops were still present in Taman and were being employed in the wars among the Kuban Tatars. Under both the terms of the treaty and in response to Russia’s friendly attitude, these troops had to be withdrawn from Taman. However, the Ottoman Empire was not attaching much importance to this.</p>
<p>Third, the article of the treaty concerning the complete amnesty of the populace had not been proclaimed in the Morea.</p>
<p>Fourth, there had been no development regarding the protection of Christians for the purposes of worship, and in many places the repair of churches was prohibited. Fifth, although you accepted to pay the amount in question in three instalments and paid the first instalment last year – albeit with some delay – eight months had passed and there was still no news about this year’s instalment. In this matter, the Ottoman Empire was acting in a manner unworthy of the dignity of a state such as Russia.</p>
<p>Sixth, Russia actually had the right to complain regarding prisoners. The Ottoman Empire was full of Russian prisoners. The officials sent to redeem them reported that the prisoners were being resold instead of being delivered, or were left in captivity. Yet the Ottomans and Tatar prisoners had been brought to the borders at Russia’s expense. Russian prisoners, however, were being imposed again as a burden on Russia in Istanbul.</p>
<p>Seventh, the Ottoman Empire was eager to bring the Tatar matter to a swift conclusion. Yet, contrary to the treaty, it was not refraining from negotiating with the Tatars. In fact, the only bond between the Ottoman Empire and the Tatars was that of the caliphate. At Focșani and Bucharest, the envoys had not objected to the Tatars’ liberty. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire could not regard the Tatars’ liberty as contrary to religion.</p>
<p>In response to this statement by Stachiev, in which he summarized the ongoing disputes between the two states within the framework of the articles of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the explanations of the reisülküttap, Atıfzade Ömer Vahid Efendi, were as follows: The Ottoman Empire was making an effort to comply with the conditions of the treaty and was fulfilling the indemnity as far as possible. The most important article that the Ottoman Empire had declared to Russia in a friendly manner and requested to be rearranged concerned Crimea. This was a religious matter, and the empress of Russia had repeatedly declared that she would not interfere in it. It was not possible for the Ottoman Empire to relinquish Crimea.</p>
<p>Atıfzade continued as follows: The purpose of peace was the security of both sides. The Ottoman Empire was avoiding initiatives that would undermine friendship. Even though it had been stated that the surrender of Kılburun was delayed, the officials assigned to surrender Kılburun had been dispatched from here in haste forty-two days before the appointed time. If any delay had occurred in the evacuation of the fortress, the responsibility lay again with the Russian boundary commissioners, who, in order to secure as much land as possible for their own state, had harassed our commissioner. Since this situation had to be reported to our state, a certain delay had necessarily occurred.</p>
<p>He stated that, in Taman, apart from one officer and twenty, thirty, or at most forty soldiers, there was not a single soldier in the name of the Ottoman Empire. It was as clear as day that the Ottoman Empire had not assigned these men to reside there. For after the conclusion of the treaty, the Tatars there had said, “If you leave this place, the state will have completely abandoned us; we too will be compelled to abandon these lands entirely. Unless our business is settled, we will not let you go.” Thus they had been obliged to remain in Taman. Even before this, the soldiers of the Ottoman Empire in the fortresses of Crimea and Taman had consisted of only three or four officers, while the rest of the soldiers were Tatars. However, because the Crimean Peninsula was an open land on all sides, guilty persons from Rumelia, Anatolia and other regions had fled to those parts in order to take refuge under the protection of the Crimean khans. For instance, Süleyman Pasha, the brother of Canikli Hacı Ali Pasha, had fled to Crimea openly with his men, fearing punishment from the Ottoman Empire, while he was still a vizier, and had sought asylum with the Crimean khan. The Ottoman Empire had not attempted to seize and punish him, and eventually, upon the request and intercession of the Crimean khan, was obliged to pardon him, restoring his rank and granting him the governorship of the province of Kefe. Likewise, the Dizdaroğulları of Giresun had also fled to Crimea and thus escaped Ottoman punishment. In light of these and similar examples, he stressed that this was a well-known matter and that it was out of the question for the Ottoman Empire to send troops to Crimea and Taman for the purpose of provocation.</p>
<p>Concerning the claim that the soldiers in Taman were intervening in the fighting among the Kuban Tatars, he replied that this was a situation unknown to the Ottoman Empire. It was, however, undeniable that the Russian Cossacks had previously come and fought here together with Şahin Giray. As for Stachiev’s statement that the Ottoman Empire should now withdraw its troops from Taman, he responded that the Ottoman Empire could not at present carry out such a withdrawal. For when the Tatars saw that these soldiers were being withdrawn from Taman, they would completely lose hope and the feared disturbances would immediately break out.</p>
<p>He added that the seizure of the property of the people of the Morea, which Stachiev had mentioned, was not as he had described. After the conclusion of the treaty, the article on the amnesty of the people had been proclaimed in the Morea as stated in the capitulation, and those who were in flight had been asked to return to their homes. However, as many of them did not return to their homeland, their property remained ownerless. Consequently, in accordance with the prevailing order of property in all states, it was decided to confiscate the property of those who were considered missing. Once a certain order was established in the Morea, these issues would somehow be resolved. During the revolt in the Morea, the wives and children of Muslims had been killed and burned. For this reason, even if those who had fled returned to their homeland and regained their property, those who had suffered would not be consoled by anything other than their execution. The fact that Russia insisted so much on behalf of the Ottomans’ own subjects appeared to contradict the compassion and respect it claimed to uphold.</p>
<p>He stated that the people of Kalavrata and Mizistre had openly burned and killed many Muslim women and children. While the Morea had no connection whatsoever with Russia, and the people who had caused such evil were deserving of punishment and retribution, the Ottoman Empire had nonetheless overlooked this and was treating the people well. The matter of churches, on the other hand, had long been implemented in accordance with the law. Whenever the repair of churches was required, the necessary permission was granted by the divan-ı hümayun. In this matter, the Ottoman Empire had never withheld from the people any permission that was in accordance with the law.</p>
<p>He further stated that the envoy had once again brought up the question of indemnity. However, at İsmail Bey’s waterside mansion, the issue of the payment of the indemnity had already been raised. Therefore, the statement “If the Crimean issue is not resolved, the payment of the indemnity will not be accepted”, other than the words attributed to İsmail Bey that “if these matters do not come into order, the treaty may be annulled and who would then have the power to postpone the indemnity?”, was rejected by the divan-ı hümayun interpreter, who stressed that no one in the Ottoman Empire had uttered such words and that baseless statements of this kind would not be of any benefit to relations between the two states.</p>
<p>He added that it was not correct for Stachiev to say that payments of forty or fifty purses from the second instalment were unworthy of the honour of his state and contrary to friendship. Likewise, it was not consistent with friendship to claim that the conditions regarding prisoners had not been fulfilled. For, he said, the envoy knew that the number of Russian prisoners in Ottoman lands was small. Indeed, although some captives had been taken during Kırım Giray Khan’s raid, most of them had died. For the remainder of the prisoners taken from Wallachia, Moldavia, Algiers and the Morea, the Ottoman Empire had appointed certain officials, and the Russian envoy had appointed others. Thus, except for those who had embraced Islam of their own free will, the captives had been located and freed.</p>
<p>He went on to say that the Russian envoy was sending lists containing the names of prisoners he had heard of from Istanbul and its surroundings, as well as from distant places, along with those whom he had personally gathered. In response to these notifications, imperial decrees had been issued and efforts had been made, and this could not be denied. He pointed out that the envoy had claimed that there were six hundred Russian prisoners in the Bolu district and that the authorities had not shown any difficulty in investigating this. He urged the Russians to report the locations and names of the prisoners whom the Ottoman officials had located and those whom they had failed to retrieve. The Ottoman Empire, he said, would show no mercy to those who disobeyed such orders. If any Russian prisoners were indeed still present in Ottoman lands, they could have been located by now with the help of Russian doctors, merchants and other persons.</p>
<p>As for their own captives, he said that the Ottomans had no one in Russian lands to report on Muslim prisoners. Therefore, they trusted Russia’s word and left the fate of their captives to the mercy of the Russian state. If the Ottoman Empire were to claim that “our prisoners are crying out in such numbers in Russian lands”, this, he said, would be a justified claim and one required by religion.</p>
<p>He stated that the Ottoman Empire had not acted in any way contrary to the conditions of the treaty regarding the Tatars after the conclusion of the treaty. If, as the Russians claimed, the Ottomans were secretly conducting affairs with the Tatars, they would not have hastened to send the regalia to Sahib Giray Khan, nor would they have repeatedly written imperial orders to remove Devlet Giray Khan from Crimea and invite him to come here. Moreover, the sending of the regalia to Sahib Giray Khan had been announced to the Russian envoy, whose secretary had then come to the Porte, asking for a postponement. The Ottoman Empire had not accepted this request because Devlet Giray Khan was still in that region and had immediately sent the regalia to Sahib Giray Khan, since this was a requirement of the treaty concluded with Russia. “Your interpreter is here,” he said, “he knows well that this is the case.” While the Russians claimed that the Ottomans had failed to fulfil the conditions of the treaty and had been dragging things out, the Ottoman Empire had, in accordance with the treaty concluded with Russia concerning the Tatars, explained this situation to them repeatedly. He stated that the liberty of the Tatars was based on this, and that the choice of khan belonged to themselves. However, he added, for the Black Sea to be divided between the two states like the Indian Ocean would be contrary to the caliphate. The Tatars had expressed this and had pressed the Ottoman Empire on this point.</p>
<p>He emphasized that the so-called acceptance of Tatar liberty in Focșani had not occurred in reality. Since this was not in conformity with the law, it had not been approved at Focșani. Even in the Bucharest negotiations that followed, when the envoys of both sides discussed the matter of Tatar liberty, the Russian envoys had stated that all the Tatars had given their consent and had even produced a written declaration. Yet this had not been accepted. Later, the chief interpreter, Palini, had brought a letter on the matter, but that too had not been approved.</p>
<p>As can be seen, Atıfzade Ömer Vahid Efendi replied to Stachiev’s statements, in which he accused the Ottoman Empire of failing to fulfil the conditions of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, in the same detailed manner.</p>
<p>In this context, the third, fourth, fifth and sixth articles of the mükâleme document again concern the prisoners between the two states and their mutual exchange. It is stated that in resolving this matter, both Russia and the Ottoman Empire would act in a friendly manner.</p>
<p>The seventh article of the mükâleme document relates to the clauses on trade in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. At this point, it is stated that the exemption of French merchants from the masdariyye tax, which even English merchants paid, was in return for the favour shown by France in the Treaty of Belgrade. Therefore, it was expressed that the fact that the Ottoman Empire had not mentioned this should be regarded as a sign of permission. The Russian envoy likewise emphasized that Russia accepted that this was one of the articles that were considered appropriate to be regulated in due time. However, he also stated that this privilege was seen as contrary to the treaty, that it was not appropriate to regard the masdariyye clause as a reciprocal equivalent, and that it was impossible for Russia to overlook it.</p>
<p>Atıfzade Ömer Vahid Efendi replied that this was a minor issue and could easily be resolved after the major problems were settled. He also underlined that it was more necessary to pay attention to the liberty of Crimea, the Tatars and other related issues.</p>
<p>In this context, the eighth article is again related to the Tatars. Stachiev made the following statements on this point: While the liberty of the Tatars had been previously accepted, before the talks at Focșani and Bucharest, by the scholars and statesmen in a council convened with the participation of the ulema and the dignitaries of the state, in a manner deemed compatible with the shari‘a, why had the Ottoman Empire now linked the liberty of the Tatars to the shari‘a? By leaving its troops in Taman, it had diverted the already hesitant Tatars from the right path. The dismissal of the khan elected by the Tatars and the appointment of Devlet Giray Khan by the Ottoman Empire were the results of intrigues arranged by certain people. The sending of the regalia to Devlet Giray and the deployment of troops to Crimea up to the present time were based on these factors. The Ottoman Empire’s attitude and actions were contrary to the conditions of the treaty. If the Ottoman Empire would resolve this matter, Russia’s opposition would disappear by itself. With the return of the Tatars present in Istanbul and the withdrawal of troops from Taman and Crimea, Russia would not refrain from discussing this matter with the Ottoman Empire.</p>
<p>The answers given by Atıfzade Ömer Vahid Efendi to Stachiev’s statements were as follows: Had the ulema approved the acceptance of Tatar liberty prior to the negotiations at Focșani and Bucharest, there would have been no need to discuss these issues again at Focșani and Bucharest, nor would they have been rejected. He reiterated that, apart from one officer and thirty or forty soldiers in Taman, no one in the name of the Ottoman troops had crossed into Crimea after the peace and that everyone knew this. Since the Russians had their own men at Kılburun, Yenikale, Tagan and Kerç, this matter was also known to them. If the Russians had been informed by their agents in the region that the Ottoman Empire had sent troops to Crimea, such information was unfounded, and it was clear that their intention was to sow discord between the two states. He said, “You may have as much permission from us as you wish; investigate and ascertain properly. If the Ottoman Empire had sent troops to Crimea after the conclusion of the peace, we would be ashamed.” He added that the dismissal and appointment of khans and the affairs he had mentioned above brought no benefit to the Ottoman Empire and that there was no reason for the Empire to seek such a confrontation. He pointed out that the Empire had already proven, through solid evidence, that it had exerted utmost effort to pacify the Tatars and to prevent them from becoming a source of discord.</p>
<p>As is clear, the Ottomans were trying to resolve these issues by appealing to Russian friendship, acknowledging the political compulsion they were under regarding the Tatars and stressing that they would attempt, as far as possible, to calm the Tatars.</p>
<p>In this context, the ninth question posed by Raif İsmail Efendi concerned the assertion that Russia had no right to complain about the Ottoman Empire, since it was Russia that was failing to fulfil the conditions. On the contrary, it was the Ottoman Empire that should complain about Russia. In particular, the failure to return Boğdan (Moldavia), even though this was clear in the treaty and required by justice, was emphasized. It was noted that this issue had been communicated to Russia several times, but no answer had been given, and that Russia had not helped in arranging this matter with Austria. It was stressed that the Ottomans had explicitly expressed that Austria should return the territory it had seized.</p>
<p>Stachiev stated that Russia had no right to intervene in this matter, as a mutual agreement had been made between the Ottoman Empire and Austria.</p>
<p>Atıfzade Ömer Vahid Efendi responded that Russia was not the guarantor of the protection of Ottoman territory and that the Ottoman Empire had no need for such a guarantee. He declared that the Ottoman claim regarding the territory of Moldavia was entirely related to the transfer of property and that the territory placed under Austrian control had not been ceded because of any alliance, but only in response to Austria’s friendly request.</p>
<p>The tenth and eleventh articles of the mükâleme document are interconnected. According to the tenth article, the article of the treaty stipulating the complete amnesty of the people had been announced not only in the Morea but also in other places, and after order was established in the Morea, it would be implemented there as well.</p>
<p>The eleventh article concerns churches. It is stated that, although the people had begun repairing the churches, the state had declared that it could not yet fulfil the article on churches. The Russian envoy’s reply to these was the same in both cases. He declared that this excuse could not be accepted, that it was contrary to the treaty, and that the Ottoman Empire should resolve these matters in a friendly way. Atıfzade Ömer Vahid Efendi emphasized that evidence was needed in this respect.</p>
<p>The twelfth and final article of the mükâleme document is also related to the Tatars. Raif İsmail Efendi stated that the Ottoman Empire did not deny the conditions concerning the Tatars. In response, Stachiev said that, in addition to the abolition of liberty, the desire to have Kerç, Kılburun and Yenikale returned and restored to their former state was, as the Ottoman Empire accepted, a claim contrary to right. Atıfzade Ömer Vahid Efendi emphasized that a good measure was needed to calm the Tatars and that to what extent this could be achieved was unknown even to the Ottoman Empire. He added that even if the sultans and mirzas in Istanbul were sent back to Crimea, the Tatars would still be unable to do anything.</p>
<p>In addition to Raif İsmail Efendi’s twelve questions and the answers given to them, there are two additional articles in the document. These were raised specifically by the Russian envoy extraordinary, Stachiev. The first concerns the collection of the debt owed to the English merchant Abot by the Janissary corps merchant (ocak bazerganı), which had previously been recorded as the property of the former Russian envoy Aleksei Mikhailovich Obreskov.</p>
<p>The second is that the issues which Russia had underlined in a friendly manner concerning Wallachia and Moldavia should also be perceived in a friendly manner by the Ottoman Empire, and that if the arrangement made regarding the poll tax (cizye) was a requirement of humanity, there could be no doubt about it. Since it was essential for his state to be informed of the arrangement, Stachiev asked to be notified of it. Vahid Efendi responded that, if it would be in the interest of the Ottoman Empire, these articles would be presented to his sovereign.</p>
<p>In short, this mükâleme document is a clear indication that, although the war had officially ended, the problems between the Ottoman Empire and Russia continued in the aftermath of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca.</p>
<p><strong>TRANSCRIPTION OF THE DOCUMENT</strong></p>
<p>The following section is the Ottoman Turkish transcription of the original mükâleme document. As it is a diplomatic record written in the language and style of its time, it has been preserved here in its original (transcribed) form.</p>

<!-- The long Ottoman Turkish transcription that follows has been intentionally left in its original language and HTML structure, as it is a direct diplomatic transcription rather than modern explanatory prose. If you would like, I can translate specific paragraphs or selected parts of this section into English as well. -->

<p><em>Mukaddemâ re’îs-i sâbık İsmail Bey’in elçiye îrâd eylediği cevâbdır[<a href="https://belgeler.gov.tr/tam-metin/111/tur#fn5">5</a>] .</em></p>
<p><strong>Evvelki mâdde[:]</strong> Bundan akdem şehr-i Mayısın yedisinde re’îs-i sâbık cenâblarının sâhilhânesinde vâkı‘ olan mahall-i müzâkerede bu dâ‘îlerine îrâd olunmuş ki sene-i mâziyyede edâsı lâzım gelen taksîti Devlet-i ‘Aliyye teslîm edüb bu vechile icrâ-yı şürût eylediği misillü bu sene dahi bu vech üzere hareket olunacağı melhûzları olmak iktizâ eder.</p>
<p><em>Mûmâ ileyhin su’âline elçinin bu def‘a meclisde verdiği cevâbdır</em></p>
<p>Devlet-i ‘Aliyye’nin makâsıd-ı dostânesini istihbâr Rusya Devleti’nin dâ’imâ bâ‘is-i mahzûziyeti olub sulh ü salâh ve hüsn-i muvâneseti devleteyne tâbi‘ olan re‘âyâ ve berâyânın refâhiyyet hâllerine esâs mesâbesinde mülâhaza etmekle her dem ve ân kemâl-i safvetle her bâbda tarafından dahi mu‘âmele-i bi’l-misle sa‘y ve ihtimâmda kusûr olunmayub Rusya Devleti’nin musâfâtından hakîkatde hâsıl olan menâfi‘-i sahîhayı Devlet-i ‘Aliyye bundan böyle niçe münâsebetle tahkîk edebilür ki sâ’ir ehibbâ-i sûrîsi gibi Rusya Devleti’nin mesâlih-i mülkiyye ve tedâbîr-i umûru muktezâsınca Devlet-i ‘Aliyye’yi işgâl ve gavâ’il-i ecnebiyyeye giriftâr etdirmek husûsu kat‘an mültezemi değildir. Mezkûrûnun defa‘âtle Devlet-i ‘Aliyye’yi giriftâr etdikleri hâletden Devlet-i ‘Aliyye ziyâde müte’essir olub bundan akdem sebkat eden muhârebe bu kaziyye-i sahîhaya bir delîl vâfî iken henüz Devlet-i ‘Aliyye gereği gibi gavrına vâsıl olmamışdır.</p>
<p><em>Bu mâddenin bu def‘a meclisde olan mükâlemesidir.</em></p>
<p>Re’îsü’l-küttâb-ı sâbık efendi ile elçinin mukaddemâ mülâkâtında kendüye îrâd olunan mâddeleri müzâkeresinde eğer çi tazmîn husûsu ikzâ-yı merâmî olduğundan hod be hod elçi-i mûmâ ileyh bu husûsu lisâna getürmüş olub lâkin şimdi güyâ bu husûs Devlet-i ‘Aliyye’nin müsellimi olmak her sûretinde hemân devletinin kemâl-i ihlâs ve dostlukda sebât kademini tebeyyün eyleyerek âğâz-ı kelâm etmekle taraf-ı kullarından dahi Rusya Devleti musâfât ve muvâlâtda sâbit kadem olduğu misillü Devlet-i ‘Aliyye dahi ‘aynı ile dostluk ve muhabbetde sebât-ı kademini isbât eylediği delâ’il-i vâzıha ile müberhendir ve bir vechile âherin tahrîki ve erbâb-ı ifsâd sözüyle mu‘âhede ve dostluğa halel getürmez ve dostluğunda kemâl-i metânetle beyne’d-düvel ne vechile mümtâz olduğu ‘âmmeye ma‘lûm olmağla bu mâddeden bahs iktizâ etmez ve tazmîn mâddesinde dahi Devlet-i ‘Aliyye’nin vermemek mülâhaza ve niyyeti bu kadar bâ‘is-i te’hîri şimdiki hâlde edâsında Devlet-i ‘Aliyye’ye göre bir mikdâr su‘ûbet olduğundan iktizâ etmekle beyne’d-düvel karz alınmış akçe dahi olsa bu vechile te’hîri mûceb-i istiğrâb ve isti‘câl ve mugâyir-i dostî olmak lâzım gelmez kelâmı îrâd ve bu mâddede olan tefâsîl-i mükâleme ve mücâvebe mahallinde aşağıda tahrîr olunmuşdur.</p>